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Short Abstract 
This chapter presents probability logic as a rationality framework for human reasoning under 
uncertainty. Selected formal-normative aspects of probability logic are discussed in the light 
of experimental evidence. Specifically, probability logic is characterized as a generalization 
of bivalent truth-functional propositional logic (short “logic”), as being connexive, and as 
being nonmonotonic. The chapter discusses selected argument forms and associated 
uncertainty propagation rules. Throughout the chapter, the descriptive validity of probability 
logic is compared to logic, which was used as the gold standard of reference for assessing the 
rationality of human reasoning in the 20th century.
Probability logic is a generalization of logic
Probability logic as a rationality framework combines probabilistic reasoning with logical 
rule-based reasoning and studies formal properties of uncertain argument forms. 
Among various approaches to probability logic (for overviews see, e.g., Hailperin, 1996; 
Adams, 1975, 1998; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002; Haenni, Romeijn, Wheeler, and 
Williamson, 2011; Demey, Kooi, and Sack, 2017), this chapter reviews selected formal-
normative aspects of probability logic in the light of experimental evidence. The focus is on 
probability logic as a generalization of the classical propositional calculus (short: logic; for 
probabilistic generalizations of quantified statements see, e.g., Hailperin, 2011; Pfeifer & 
Sanfilippo, 2017, 2019). The generalization is obtained by (i) the use of  probability functions
and (ii) by the introduction of the conditional event as a logical object, which is not 
expressible within logic. This generalization is currently most frequently investigated from a 
psychological point of view (see, e.g., Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2009; Oaksford and N. Chater, 
2010; Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over, 2016) and it is thus most suitable for discussing 
empirical and normative aspects of probability logic as a rationality framework. The 
empirical focus is on investigating general patterns of human reasoning under uncertainty and
not on data modeling.      
Logic is bivalent as it deals with true and false as the two truth values, which are assigned to 
propositional variables (denoted by upper case letters in italics; for logic see also chapter 3.1. 
by Steinberger, in this volume). Truth-tables can be used to define logical connectives, like 
conjunction (“A and B”, denoted by “A&B”), disjunction (“A or B”, denoted by “AvB”), 
negation (“not-A” denoted by “~A”), or the material conditional, which is the disjunction 
~AvB. Probability logic generalizes logic by using the real-valued unit interval from zero to 
one instead of just two truth values: truth value functions are generalized by probability 
functions. While logic is truth-functional, probability logic is only partially truth functional as
usually a probability-interval is obtained in the conclusion even from point-valued premise 
probabilities. Probability functions can be used to formalize a real or an ideal agent’s degree 
of belief in propositions formed by logical connectives, e.g., in A&B, AvB, or in ~A. 
Moreover, conditional probability functions can measure the degree of belief in a conditional 
event, i.e., p(B|A). The conditional event B|A is a three-valued logical entity, which is true if 
A&B is true, false if A&~B is true, and void (or undetermined) if ~A is true.1 Since the 
1 Note that the conditional event must not be nested: neither A nor B in B|A may contain 
occurrences of “|”,  because of Lewis’ (1976) triviality results. For nested conditionals and
logical operations among conditionals complexer structures are needed to avoid triviality, 
conditional event cannot be expressed by a two-valued proposition, it is by definition not 
propositional and constitutes a further generalization of logic. Using the betting interpretation
of probability, “true” means that the bet is won, “false” means that the bet is lost, and “void” 
means that the bet is called off (i.e., you get your money back).
Note that p(A)=0 does not imply that A is logically impossible (i.e., a logical contradiction 
┴). However, p(┴) is necessarily equal to zero. As it does not make sense to add ┴ to your 
stock of belief (or to bet on a conditional where ┴ is its antecedent), it is obvious why “A|┴” 
is undefined in the coherence approach.2  The semantics of the conditional event matches the 
participant’s responses in the truth table tasks (see, e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; see 
also chapter 4.6. by Oberauer and Pessach in this volume): most people judge that (i) A&B 
confirms the conditional if A then B, (ii) A&~B disconfirms it, and that (iii) ~A is irrelevant 
for if A then B. Under the material conditional interpretation one would expect that rational 
people judge that ~A confirms the conditional. As this expectation was violated, the response 
pattern (i)-(iii) was pejoratively called “defective truth table”. Within the rationality 
framework of probability logic, however, this response is perfectly rational, as it matches the 
semantics of the conditional event (see, e.g., Over and Baratgin, 2017; Pfeifer and Tulkki, 
2017b; Kleiter et al., 2018; see also chapter 6.2. by Over and Cruz in this volume).
Conditional probability, zero-antecedent probabilities, and paradoxes
Traditionally, conditional probability is defined by
(1) p(B|A) =def.  p(A&B)/p(A), if p(A)>0. 
Condition p(A)>0 serves here to avoid fractions over zero. But what if p(A)=0? Then, the 
conditional probability is undefined or default assumptions about p(B|A) are made. Some 
which go beyond the scope of this chapter (see, e.g., the theory of “conditional random 
quantities”; Gilio and Sanfilippo, 2014; Sanfilippo, Pfeifer, & Gilio, 2017; Sanfilippo, 
Pfeifer, Over, & Gilio, 2018).
2 Popper functions, however, allow for conditioning on contradictions (see Coletti et al., 
2001, for a discussion).
approaches suggest for example, by default, to equate p(B|A) with 1 in this case (e.g., Adams,
1998, footnote 5, p. 57). However, this leads to wrong results, since then also p(~B|A)=1, 
which violates the basic probabilistic principle p(B|A)+p(~B|A)=1 (see Gilio, 2002, for a 
discussion). Moreover, from a practical point of view, if p(B|A) is left undefined, 
counterintuitive consequences may follow. Consider, for example, the following “paradox of 
the material conditional”:
(2) B. Therefore, if A, then B.     
The argument (2) consists of a premise B and a conditional as its conclusion. Under the 
material conditional interpretation, (2) is logically valid (i.e., it is impossible that the premise 
set is true while the conclusion is false). However, natural language instantiations  can appear
counterintuitive (instantiate, for example,  “The moon is made of green cheese.” for A and 
“The sun will shine in Vienna.” for B). This mismatch between the logical validity of (2) and 
counterintuitive instantiations constitute the paradox. From a logical point of view, a logically
valid argument remains logically valid whatever the instantiations are. If (2) is formalized in 
probability logic, however, the paradox is blocked when the conditional is represented by a 
conditional probability: then, the argument is probabilistically non-informative:
(3) p(B)=x. Therefore, 0 ≤ p(B|A) ≤ 1 is coherent for all probability values x.
An argument is probabilistically non-informative when the premise probabilities do not 
constrain the probability of the conclusion. More technically, probabilistic non-
informativeness means that for all coherent probabilitiy assessments of the premises: the 
tightest coherent probability bounds on the conclusion coincide with the unit interval, [0,1]. 
Here, “coherence” means the avoidance of Dutch books. A Dutch book is a combination of 
symmetric bets which leads to sure win (or to sure loss; see also chapter 4.1. by Hájek and 
Staffel in this volume). In the coherence-based approach, the avoidance of Dutch books is 
equivalent to the solvability of a specific linear system. This solvability reflects the existence 
of at least one probability distribution on a suitable partition of the constituents (i.e., the 
possible cases), which is compatible with the initial probability assessment. In geometrical 
terms, a probability assessment can be represented by a prevision point P and the set of 
constituents by a set Q of binary points. Then, P is coherent if and only if it belongs to the 
convex hull of Q.
If the conditional in (2) is represented by the probability of the material conditional, the 
paradox is inherited:
 (4) p(B)=x. Therefore, x ≤ p(~AvB) ≤ 1 is coherent for all probability 
values x.
Note that in general (3) is probabilistically non-informative for all positive premise 
probabilities (i.e., p(B)>0). For the extreme case p(B)=1, when conditional probabilities are 
defined by (1), then p(B|A) = 1 or undefined. This is obvious since if p(B)=1, then 
p(A&B)=P(A); therefore, by (1), p(B|A)=p(A&B)/P(A)=p(A)/P(A)=1, provided p(A)>0. If  
p(A)=0, then P(B|A) is undefined. This result is counterintuitive and does not match the 
experimental data: people interpret (3) as probabilistically non-informative, even in the case 
of p(B)=1 (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2011). However, in coherence-based probability logic (see, 
e.g., Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, Pfeifer, and Sanfilippo, 2016), where p(B|A) is 
primitive and problems with zero antecedent probabilities are avoided, 0 ≤ p(B|A) ≤ 1 is 
coherent even in the extreme case p(B)=1 (for a detailed proof see Pfeifer, 2014). This 
example shows that the evaluation of the rationality of a probabilistic inference depends on 
whether the underlying probability concept allows for dealing with zero-antecedent 
probabilities or not. In the framework of coherence, the probabilistic-non-informativeness of 
argument (3) holds for all probability values of the premises; for approaches, however, which 
are based on (1), it holds only for positive probabilities. 
From truth-table tasks to probabilistic truth-table tasks
Logic dominated the psychology of deductive reasoning as a rationality framework in the 20th
century. Prominent examples are Braine and O’Brien’s “mental logic” (1998; see also chapter
3.2. by O’ Brien in this volume) or the “mental rule theory” by Rips (1994) and Johnson-
Laird’s (1983) theory of mental models (see chapter 2.3. by Johnson-Laird in this volume). 
The rationality framework of the former two theories is derived from classical logical proof 
theory (“rule-based”), whereas the latter one is based on logical model theory (“semantic-
model-based”). According to these logic-based rationality frameworks people are rational, if 
they use logically valid rules of inference (like modus ponens) or if they build mental models 
which are inspired by truth tables. With the advent of the “new paradigm psychology of 
reasoning”, which is characterized by using probabilistic rationality frameworks instead of 
logic, not only the evaluation of the rationality of human inference changed but also the task 
paradigms were adapted. The above-mentioned truth table task, for example, became a 
probabilistic truth table task (short PTTT) to investigate how people interpret conditionals 
(Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer and Wilhelm, 2003; see also chapter 4.6. by Oberauer and 
Pessach in this volume). From a probability logical point of view, the PTTT presented the 
following premises to the participants:
(5) p(A&B)=x1, p(A&~B)=x2, p(~A&B)=x3, and p(~A&~B)=x4. 
Then the participants were asked to infer their degree of belief in the conditional “if A, then 
B” based on the probabilistic information given in (5). The main result of this task was that 
most participants responded by values obtained from x1/(x1+x2), which corresponds to the 
conditional probability interpretation of conditionals (p(B|A); this is consistent with the 
“Ramsey test” as described in chapter 6.2. by Over and Cruz in this volume). A significant 
minority responded by x1, which corresponds to the conjunction interpretation of conditionals
(p(A&B)). Under the material conditional interpretation, one would expect x1+x3+x4 as the 
modal response in this task. However, experimental evidence for this hypothesis was 
negligible. When the task was given several times to the same participants, a “shift of 
interpretation” was observed among those participants who did not use conditional 
probability responses in the first PTTT tasks. These participants “shifted” to the conditional 
probability interpretation through the course of the experiment. In the last tasks of the 
experiment, about 80% of the responses were consistent with the conditional probability 
interpretation. This is a strong indicator that conditional probability is the competence 
response (see Fugard et al., 2011; Pfeifer, 2013). 
Mostly indicative conditionals (“if―then” formulations) with “abstract” material were used 
in the PTTT (like “if the figure shows a square, then the figure is red”). Interestingly, the 
finding that conditional probability is the best predictor for the data was also replicated for a 
bigger variety of conditionals: causal conditionals (“if cause, then effect”), counterfactual 
conditionals (“if A were the case, then B would be the case”; Over et al., 2007; Pfeifer and 
Stöckle-Schobel, 2015), and abductive conditionals (“if effect, then cause”; Pfeifer and 
Tulkki, 2017a). 
The next sections explain why probability logic validates basic connexive principles and why
it is nonmonotonic under the conditional probability interpretation of conditionals.
Probability logic is connexive
Connexive logics are motivated by the idea that there should be some connection between 
antecedents and consequents of conditionals in the sense that they should not contradict each 
other. Connexive logics are alternatives to (classical) logic as they are neither contained in 
nor proper extensions of it (for an overview see Wansing, 2016). They include, for example, 
Aristotle’s theses:
(AT1) It is not the case that: if ~A, then A.
and 
(AT2) It is not the case that: if A, then ~A. 
Under the material conditional, (AT1) and (AT2) are contingent in logic (i.e., (AT1) is 
logically equivalent to ~A and (AT2) is logically equivalent to A). Thus, within logic, it is 
rational to say that it depends on the truth value of A whether (AT1) and (AT2) is true. Indeed,
(AT1) and (AT2) are not tautologies in logic. Experimental data suggest, however, that people
believe that (AT1) as well as (AT2) must be true (Pfeifer, 2012). Probability logic allows for 
validating the rationality of (AT1) and (AT2). First, look at the conditionals (in terms of 
conditional probabilities): by coherence, p(A|~A) and p(~A|A) must be equal to zero. Second, 
these conditionals are negated by negating their consequents, i.e., p(~A|~A) and p(~~A|
A)=p(A|A), respectively. Since probability one is the only coherent assessment for p(~A|~A) 
and for p(A|A), (AT1) and (AT2) are validated. This matches the experimental data (Pfeifer, 
2012; Pfeifer and Tulkki, 2017b). 
Boethius theses are another instance of connexive principles. Like Aristotle’s theses, Boethius
theses can be justified within probability logic (but not within logic). The two versions of 
Boethius theses are (the arrow denotes a conditional):
(BT1) (A → B) → ~(A → ~ B) 
and
(BT2) (A→ ~ B) → ~(A→B). 
By the narrow scope negation interpretation of negating conditionals,3 the antecedent of 
(BT1) is interpreted in probability logic by P(B|A) and its consequent by P(~~B|A), which is 
equal to P(B|A). Thus, (BT1) holds in probability logic. Analogously, (BT2) is validated in 
probability logic. Under the material conditional interpretation, neither (BT1) nor (BT2) hold 
in general: (BT1) and (BT2) are logically equivalent to A. Moreover, Abelard’s First 
Principle, which is another connexive principle, can be rationally justified in probability 
3 For a wide-scope negation interpretation of negating conditionals see Gilio, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo (2016) 
and Pfeifer & Sanfilippo (2017).
logic:
(AFP) ~((A →B) & (A → ~ B))
Since, in general P(B|A)+P(~B|A)=1, it cannot be the case that both, P(B|A) and P(~B|A) are 
“high” (i.e., at least greater than .5). Therefore, (AFP) is validated in probability logic. 
However, (AFP) is logically equivalent to A under the material conditional interpretation. 
Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses, and Abelard’s First Principle are intuitively plausible 
principles which hold in connexive and in probability logic, but not in (propositional) logic. 
Aristotle’s theses received strong experimental support (Pfeifer, 2012; Pfeifer and Tulkki, 
2017b). For the other connexive principles future empirical research is needed.  
 
Probability logic is nonmonotonic
Nonmonotonic reasoning is about retracting conclusions in the light of new evidence. For 
example, from “if this animal is a bird (B), then this animal can fly (F)” one would not want 
to conclude that “if this animal is a bird and a penguin (B&P), then this animal can fly (F)”. 
Logic, however, is monotonic: adding premises to a logically valid argument can only lead to 
an increase but never to a decrease of the conclusion set (for an overview see, e. g., Antoniou,
2010; Strasser and Antonelli, 2016). Therefore, conclusions cannot be retracted in logic. 
Under the material conditional interpretation, the above-mentioned argument is logically 
valid. The argument form is called “monotonicity” (or “premise strengthening”): 
(MON) ~B v F logically implies ~(B&P) v F.
In probability logic, however, the corresponding argument form is probabilistically non-
informative and monotonicity is therefore blocked:
(6) p(F|B)=x. Therefore, 0 ≤ p(F|B&P) ≤ 1 is coherent for all probability 
values x.
Basic rationality principles for retracting conclusions in the light of new evidence are 
concentrated around System P (Kraus et al., 1990). The principles of System P are considered
as minimal rationality requirements for any system of nonmonotonic reasoning: it is therefore
a key system for reasoning in general. Various different semantics were developed for  
nonmonotonic reasoning systems, among which some are probability logical ones (see, e. g., 
Adams, 1975; Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996; Schurz, 1996; Gilio, 2002; Hawthorne and 
Makinson, 2007). Psychologically, Pfeifer and Kleiter (2005, 2006, 2010) and Pfeifer and 
Tulkki (2017b) present experimental data supporting the coherence-based probability 
semantics of System P (Gilio, 2002; for  experimental studies on the possibilistic semantics of
System P see, e. g., Da Silva Neves et al., 2002; Benferhat et al., 2005). In the coherence 
semantics default conditionals “A normally B” are interpreted as coherent conditional 
probabilities, which may be imprecise (i. e., interval-valued probabilities). For each rule of 
System P, Gilio (2002) proved the probability propagation rules, which describe how the 
probabilities of the premises are propagated to the conclusion. As an example, consider the 
and rule:
(AND) x' ≤ p(B|A) ≤ x'' and y' ≤ p(C|A) ≤ y'' . Therefore,  
max{0, x'+y' - 1}≤ p(B&C|A) ≤ min{x'', y''} is coherent. 
It can easily be seen that even in cases where the premise probabilities are point-valued (i.e., 
x' = x'' and y' = y''), the probability of the conclusion is usually interval-valued. In the 
extreme case, where the premise probabilities are equal to one, the only coherent conclusion 
probability is also equal to one. Experimental data suggest that most people infer coherent 
interval responses. The majority of those people who violate coherence violate the lower 
bound (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005). These data speak also against the common misunderstanding
that people are unable to perform probabilistic reasoning because of the high frequency of 
“conjunction fallacies” allegedly committed in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) well-known 
Linda task. The conjunction fallacy consists in ranking the probability of a conjunction 
(B&C) as higher compared to one of its conjuncts (C). In the context of (AND), this would 
mean that the upper probability bound on the conclusion is violated. In the experimental data 
on (AND), however, those people who violated the coherent interval, violated the lower 
probability bound (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005). Even if the terms “and” and “probability” are 
mentioned, it does not mean that actual conjunction probabilities are investigated in the Linda
task: the participants might not interpret the task as a task about conjunction probabilities. 
Concerning the other rules of System P, strong agreement between the participants’ interval 
responses and the coherent intervals were observed (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005, 2006, 2010; 
Pfeifer and Tulkki, 2017b). Moreover, the majority of the participants correctly understood 
that (6) and that contraposition (e.g., p(B|A) = x. Therefore, 0 ≤ p(~A|~B) ≤ 1 is coherent for 
all probabilities x) are probabilistically non-informative. This is interesting as these argument 
forms are logically valid under the material conditional but they cannot be validated without 
further assumptions in a nonmonotonic reasoning system. Adding monotonicity or 
contraposition to System P, for example, would make System P monotonic (which is 
undesirable of course). Transitivity is also probabilistically non-informative (i.e., p(B|A) = x, 
p(C|B)=y. Therefore,  0 ≤ p(C|A) ≤ 1 is coherent for all probabilities x and y) and its addition 
to System P would make it monotonic. Experimental data suggest, that people interpret the 
task material of Transitivity presumably because of pragmatic reasons as CUT of System P 
(Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006, 2010): CUT or cumulative transitivity strengthens the premises of 
transitivity by adding the antecedent of the first premise by conjunction to the antecedent of 
the second premise (Gilio, 2002):
(CUT)  p(B|A) = x, p(C|A&B)=y. Therefore,  xy ≤ p(C|A) ≤ xy+1-x.
Note that the probability propagation rules of (CUT) coincide with those of the probabilistic 
modus ponens (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006a): 
(MP) p(B) = x, p(C|B)=y. Therefore,  xy ≤ p(C) ≤ xy+1-x.
This close relationship between (CUT) and (MP) is explained by the fact that unconditional 
probabilities are defined in probability logic by the following principle:   
(7) p(A)=def. p(A|verum), where “verum” denotes a logical tautology. 
By replacing A by verum in (CUT) and by (7), we obtain (MP). Modus ponens is one of the 
most frequently investigated argument forms in the psychology of reasoning. Its non-
probabilistic version is usually endorsed by most participants (Evans et al., 1993). The clear 
majority of responses in tasks on the probabilistic modus ponens support the predictions by 
probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2009; Pfeifer and Tulkki, 2017b). 
Concluding remarks
This chapter characterized probability logic as a generalization of logic and explained the 
importance of zero-antecedent probabilities. Probability logic is connexive and 
nonmonotonic. It is a powerful tool to investigate the rationality of reasoning in a unified and 
systematic way. Experimental studies support its descriptive validity. Future normative and 
descriptive research directions should include nested and compound conditionals. The 
probabilistic modus ponens and other argument forms, for example, were recently 
generalized to deal with nested and compounds of conditionals (Sanfilippo et al., 2017; 
Sanfilippo et al., 2018). Interestingly, the uncertainty propagation rules for the modus ponens 
involving nested conditionals coincide with those of the non-nested modus ponens (MP). For 
instance, consider the following nested version of the modus pones: from the cup breaks if 
dropped (D→B) and if the cup breaks if dropped, then the cup is fragile ((D→B)→F) infer 
the cup is fragile (F). Here, the lower bound of the degree of belief in the conclusion F equals
the product of the degrees of belief in the premises and the upper bound on F equals the sum 
of the lower bound on F plus 1 minus the degree of belief in D→B, which coincides with the 
uncertainty propagation rules of the non-nested (MP) (for details see Sanfilippo et al., 2017). 
In this approach, which is based on previsions in conditional random quantities, the law of 
import-export does not hold (Gilio and Sanfilippo, 2014), which is key to block Lewis’ 
(1976) notorious triviality results. Lewis’ triviality results show that sentences like 
(D→B)→F must not be simply interpreted by p(F|(B|D)). Rather, a richer formal structure is 
required for properly investigating such structures. Future work is needed to assess the 
psychological plausibility of this approach.
Finally, one might wonder why various non-classical logics—which validate inutitively 
plausible rationality principles—were broadly neglected in the psychological literature, even 
if they were available already for decades. The reasons might be due to research traditions. 
This chapter proposed probability logic as normatively and descriptively appealing rationality
framework for human reasoning, which combines (i) the requirement of plausible qualitative 
logical principles (like nonmonotonicity and connexivity) with (ii) the expressibility of 
quantitative degrees of beliefs for investigating reasoning and argumentation under 
uncertainty.
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